This paper analyzes the Federal Reserve's major policy actions in response to the financial crisis. The analysis is divided into the pre-Lehman and postLehman monetary policies. Specifically, I describe the pre-and post-Lehman monetary policy actions that I believe were appropriate and those that were not. I then describe the monetary policy actions the Fed should have taken and why those actions would have fostered better financial market and economic outcomes. Had these actions been taken, the Fed's balance sheet would have returned to normal and the FOMC's target for the federal funds rate would be a level consistent with a positive real rate and an inflation target of 2 percent.
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The financial crisis began on August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas, France's largest bank, halted redemption of three investment funds. The federal funds rate spiked about 13 basis points on the day only to fall by nearly 75 basis points the next. The Fed's initial response was anemic:
On August 10, the Fed announced that the discount window was "open for business;" on August 17, the primary credit rate (the discount rate) was cut by 50 basis points. As evidence mounted that difficulties in financial markets were intensifying, the Fed took bolder steps: The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decreased the federal funds rate from 5.25 percent to 2 percent in a series of seven moves between September 18, 2007, and April 30, 2008 ; the primary lending rate was reduced to 25 basis points on December 11; and Term Auction Facility (TAF) was introduced on December 12. 1 2 Treasuries while simultaneously selling the same amount of short-term Treasuries.
2 I discuss which of the Fed's primary monetary policy actions were appropriate and which were not. I also discuss what the Fed should have done, along with reasons why the economic recovery would have been stronger had the FOMC followed these suggestions. Indeed, Lehman might not have failed, and even if the output response would not have been stronger, the FOMC would at least not be mired in a Japanese-style zero interest rate policy. These actions were intended to stimulate aggregate demand by reducing longer-term yields.
My analysis begins with a discussion of "conventional" versus "unconventional" monetary policy. I then discuss the Fed's pre-Lehman monetary policy, followed by a discussion of its post-Lehman monetary policy. I present my analysis of how the Fed should have responded to the financial crisis and the reasons why my approach would have likely resulted in better financial market and economic outcomes. I conclude with some thoughts about the direction that policy should now take.
Conventional Versus Unconventional Monetary Policy
At a fundamental level, the Fed has done one thing historically: It has expanded or contracted its balance sheet through its lending and investing activities. These activities increase or decrease the monetary base and the supply of credit. Given the structure of the banking system and reserve requirements, changes in the monetary base are linked to changes in the supply of money. Indeed, the effect on the money supply is thought to be the reason that Fed actions affect interest rates: The demand for money is a function of interest rates so that an increase in the supply of money causes interest rates to decline via the so-called liquidity effect. I have noted 3 elsewhere (Thornton, 2012a) , however, that monetary policy actions can affect interest rates even if the money demand was not a function of the interest rate. The reason is that the Fed's lending and investing activities affect the supply of credit. This is true even if the demand for money was independent of the interest rate, or if, as Woodford (2000) has suggested might happen, money did not exist. Until the 1990s, it was believed that the Fed controlled the federal funds rate by adjusting the supply of reserves (credit) in the funds market through daily open market operations-increase the monetary base and the federal funds rate falls; decrease the base and the federal funds rate rises.
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The important point is any action the Fed takes to change the supply of credit-either by making loans or purchasing assets-is conventional monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Act gives the Fed the authority to purchase a wide variety of assets, other than those which it has purchased historically (Thornton, 2009, p. 18 ).
Indeed, this mechanism continues to appear in textbook descriptions of how the Fed controls the federal funds rate. However, since at least the mid1990s, the Fed has controlled the federal funds rate though open mouth operations; the FOMC simply announces its target and the federal funds rate immediately adjusts to the new target level.
This mechanism works because the market believes that the Fed has the power and willingness to achieve and maintain the new target level. Elsewhere (Thornton, 2010d) I show that greater control over the federal funds rate has been accompanied by a marked deterioration in the relationship between the federal funds rate and longer-term Treasury yields. However, Section 13(c) of the Act gives the Federal Reserve Board the authority to make loans and provide financial assistance to whomever in "unusual and exigent" circumstances. Hence, loans made to any institution other than depository institutions are unconventional in the sense that "unusual and exigent" circumstances arise very infrequently.
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What are the FOMC's truly unconventional policies? There are two: (1) the use of forward guidance, whereby the FOMC attempted to reduce longer-term interest rates by publically committing to keep the policy rate at zero for an extended period of time; and (2) Operation Twist, whereby the FOMC attempted to reduce longer-term rates by purchasing longterm securities and simultaneously selling an equivalent quantity of short-term securities, thereby leaving the total supply of credit unchanged.
Pre-Lehman Monetary Policy
There were just two major policy actions prior to Lehman: The 325-basis-point reduction in the federal funds rate target between September 18, 2007 and April 30, 2008 , and the Fed's lending primarily through the TAF. The reduction of the federal funds rate target was appropriate but largely ineffective. For one thing, the interest rate channel of monetary policy is relatively weak and has long been considered so for a variety of reasons Gertler, 1995, and Thornton, 2010c) . The interest rate channel will be particularly ineffective during economic crises because the expected return on capital spending is typically marked down so low that 5 investment is unattractive at virtually any interest rate. This is particularly true for residential and commercial investment in the current economic crisis because of the enormous overhang in residential and commercial real estate capital. Finally, the ability of central banks to affect longer-term rates that matter for economic activity is thought to be limited (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Greenspan, 1993; and Thornton, 2012a,b) .
The consensus that the interest rate channel of monetary policy is relatively ineffective was the primary motivation for the credit channel of monetary policy. However, the credit channel is also of questionable strength. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) point out the credit channel has two distinct parts-the net worth channel and the bank lending channel. Thornton (1994) shows that the ability of banks to obtain funds for lending in the certificate of deposit (CD) market significantly mitigates the effectiveness of the bank lending channel and presents evidence that this channel is weak at best.
The net worth channel is based on the idea that the larger the net worth of the borrower, the more likely the borrower will have access to external finance. This provides a mechanism whereby changes in interest rates can affect borrower's net worth. There are two possibilities.
First, a rise in interest rates will increase a borrower's interest expense to the extent that the borrower has short-term debt on the balance sheet. This will reduce the cash flow and the ability to secure credit. Second, rising interest rates may cause a decline in asset prices, which reduces the borrower's net worth, and thereby, collateral. These effects are second order and would vary considerably depending on the structure of the balance sheet of individual borrowers. Moreover, the direct effect on a borrower's net worth should be large only if the borrower is holding relatively long-dated assets and then only if the change in the overnight policy rate was accompanied by a change in longer-term rates; this is very doubtful, at least since the late 1980s 6 (Thornton, 2010d) . In any event, the empirical support of the credit channel is weak (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Ashcraft, 2006; Holod and Peek, 2007; and Bernanke, 2007) .
Sterilized Lending
During a financial crisis, risk premiums rise and credit markets freeze up because of uncertainty and the corresponding increase in credit risk. Considerable uncertainty arose this time because financial institutions were holding large quantities of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The quality of most of these MBS was largely unknown even to the financial institutions holding them. The existence of large quantities of these so-called toxic assets made it difficult to assess the credit-worthiness of borrowers. Financial institutions were forced to spend considerable time and resources to determine the quality of their MBS portfolios. In such an environment, the Fed could have facilitated the adjustment process by massively increasing the supply of credit through open market operations and direct lending (Allen and Gale, 2008) .
The Fed made significant loans to depository institutions, primarily through the TAF.
However, the Fed sterilized the effect of its lending activities on the supply of credit (i.e., the monetary base) by selling an equivalent quantity of government securities. Sterilized lending is not unconventional. The Fed has historically sterilized discount window lending. Indeed, it has an incentive to do so when it is attempting to control either the federal funds rate or the money supply (Thornton 2001b ).
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The volume of lending during the pre-Lehman period was sufficiently large that, had it not been sterilized, the FOMC would have had to reduce the federal funds rate target 7 significantly more than it did. This does not appear to be the reason the FOMC sterilized its preLehman lending, however. The apparent motive for sterilizing the lending was unconventional.
Chairman Bernanke (2009) Goodfriend (2011) mentions that sterilized lending through the TAF-which he calls credit policy-was a mistake. However, his suggestion that TAF lending exposed taxpayers to excessive risk of loss because "central bank lending that is collateralized fully exposes taxpayers to losses if the borrower fails subsequently" is an overstatement. Also, his definition of monetary policy-"open market operations that expand or contract high-powered money (bank reserves plus currency) by buying or selling Treasury securities" is too narrow. Actions which increase the size of the adjusted monetary base are monetary policy actions, regardless of their intent. Moreover, this definition would seem to apply only if the Fed were constrained to have zero default risk. However, the Federal Reserve Act allows the Fed to purchase a wide range of assets. Hence, it imposes no such requirement. The desire to be self sustaining motivates the Fed to minimize default risk on its balance sheet. The Fed accomplishes this by only purchasing highgrade securities and by making highly collateralized loans. Hence, I agree with Goodfriend (2011) that the Fed's decision to add $29 billion in "toxic assets" to its balance sheet, in order to rescue of Bear Stearns, was a mistake for this reason. This is unconventional. Historically the Fed has argued that it is size and not the composition of the balance sheet that matters: the Fed's job is to supply credit; the market's job is to allocate the credit to its most efficient use. Before Lehman, the Fed apparently believed that the market's ability to allocate credit efficiently was impaired, so it took on the job of reallocating credit (Thornton, 2009 ).
I view the Fed's decision to reallocate the existing quantity of credit to particular financial institutions a major policy error. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) Consequently, the Fed's ability to continue its sterilization policy was significantly impaired.
Whatever the rationale, the action was appropriate. The effectiveness of this action is reflected in risk spreads. Figure 
The Federal Funds Rate Target and Forward Guidance
Figure 3, which plots the monetary base, the federal funds rate, and the FOMC's federal funds rate target weekly over the period January 2006 through April 2012, shows that the massive increase in the monetary base was accompanied by a decline in the federal funds rate to near zero long before the FOMC reduced its federal funds rate target to that level. Indeed, the last three reductions in the FOMC's federal funds rate target were the endogenous responses of the FOMC to a supply-induced decline in the federal funds rate. This is illustrated in Figure 4 which shows the effective federal funds rate, the federal funds rate target, and the 1-month OIS rate daily from January 2, 2007 through February 28, 2009. The vertical line denotes September 15, 2008. Prior to that date, the federal funds rate declined immediately on the announcement of a target change-reflecting the open mouth operations discussed in Section 2. Moreover, the 1-month OIS rate declined ahead of the target change, reflecting the fact that target changes were anticipated somewhat before they occurred. After Lehman, however, the federal funds rate declined in advance of target changes and the OIS rate lagged rather than led changes in the federal funds rate. This reflects the fact, as suggested in Section 3.1, that a massive increase in the supply of credit by the Fed would cause the federal funds rate to decline significantly. The fact that the FOMC did not immediately reduce the target to zero indicates that the FOMC did not appreciate this fact. This suggests that the decision to sterilize its pre-Lehman lending was not because the FOMC believed it would be unable to maintain its federal funds rate target had it not sterilized its lending, but rather because it was pursuing a credit reallocation policy as Bernanke's (2008a Bernanke's ( ,b, 2009 ) statements suggest.
The decision to reduce the federal funds rate target to between zero and 25 basis points was accompanied by the adoption of forward guidance. The FOMC had briefly experimented with forward guidance between 2003 and 2005 (Kool and Thornton, 2012 . The first attempt at forward guidance was likely motivated by a January 2003 FOMC discussion of Woodford's (1999 Woodford's ( , 2001 Woodford's ( , 2003 suggestion that the efficacy of central banks' interest rate policy could be increased if the central bank committed to keep its policy rate at a given level for a longer period of time. Governor Bernanke noted, "I'm very interested in this basic point that the Fed should be more predictable in order to use the short-term rate to influence long-term rates…" Following up on a suggestion that the Fed's behavior was not inertial, Bernanke suggested the Fed's behavior should be more inertial "in order to get more effect on long-term rates." In any event, after reducing the federal funds rate target to the then historically low level of 1 percent in June 2003, the FOMC announced that it "believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period." When it began increasing the target in June 2004, the Committee announced "that policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured."
After reducing the federal funds rate target to between zero and 25 basis points in December 2007, the FOMC noted that it "anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time." The Committee became more aggressive in its use of forward guidance at the August 2011 meeting by announcing that it "anticipates that economic conditions…are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013." The period of forward guidance was lengthened to "late 2014" at the January 2012 meeting.
The theoretical justification for forward guidance is the Expectations Hypothesis (EH) of the term structure on interest rates. The EH asserts that a rate on a long-term security with maturity n at time t is equal the average of the time-t expectation for the rate on an otherwise equivalent security with maturity m ( ) m n < plus a constant term premium. The EH has been massively rejected (e.g., Sarno, et al. 2007 , and the references therein) using a wide variety of interest rates, sample periods, and monetary policy regimes. While a variety of explanations for the failure of the EH have been advanced, Guidolin and Thornton (2012) show that a likely reason is short-term interest rates are essentially unpredictable beyond their current level.
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The massive empirical failure of the EH and the lack of empirical support for the effectiveness of forward guidance policies generally suggest that the FOMC's forward guidance policy may have been unsuccessful. This conclusion is intensified by the lack of support for the interest rate channel of monetary policy. The interest rate channel of policy is likely to be particularly weak during economic crises. Hence, it seems particularly unlikely that the FOMC's current forward guidance policy will be effective in facilitating an economic recovery.
In any event, there is little evidence that forward guidance improves central banks' control over longerterm rates (Anderson and Hoffman, 2010; Goodhart and Lim, 2008; Kool and Thornton, 2012) . 
Quantitative Easing
Quantitative easing (QE) is a policy of purchasing a large quantity of longer-term assets and maintaining a very large portfolio of government and private debt. The objective of QE and forward guidance is the same-to reduce longer-term yields and thereby increase the efficacy of monetary policy. I have noted elsewhere (Thornton, 2010c (Thornton, , 2012b 
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There are several reasons for believing that the LSAP programs had little, if any, effect on longer-term rates. For one thing, most of the evidence supporting the effectiveness of LSAP in reducing interest rates comes from event studies (Gagnon, et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Neely, 2011; and Joyce, et al., 2010) which show that there was an unusually large decline in longer-term yields on the days of certain LSAP announcements-i.e.,
there was an announcement effect. However, to be convincing, the announcement effect should be persistent. However, Wright (2011) shows that these announcement effects were short-lived.
More generally, it is virtually impossible to infer a causal relationship between announcement effects and more persistent or permanent movements in longer-term yields that matter for spending decisions. 12 One way to investigate this possibility is to see whether there is a significant change in the trend following key announcements. Because interest rates are highly persistent, this can be done by regressing the change in the 10-year yield on a constant term and dummy variable that takes the value of one after an announcement and zero before the announcement and testing the hypothesis that the coefficient on the dummy variable is zero. The coefficient on the constant term reflects the average daily change in the rate over the period, called the drift. If the coefficient dummy variable is not negative and statistically significant from zero, there is no significant change in the drift. This would announcement and continued to do so for a significant period after. This very simple analysis suggests that these announcements had little or no lasting effect on yields. More generally, statistically significant announcement effects do not provide compelling evidence that LSAP caused longer-term interest rates to decline secularly.
More compelling evidence of a lack of an effect of QE on longer-term yields is the fact that there is no evidence that the LSAPs were effective using lower-frequency, monthly, data.
Elsewhere, (Thornton, 2012b) I show that the strongest evidence supporting the portfolio balance channel using monthly data (Gagnon, et al., 2011) is due entirely to a common trend in the data R are very small, so this does not constitute strong evidence against the hypothesis that these announcements had an effect beyond the drift which had began earlier, but there is no evidence that these announcements had a separate effect either. used.
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Even if QE caused a significant decline in Treasury yields, the effect on economic activity should have been relatively modest. The reason is the effectiveness of QE and Operation Twist on long-term Treasury yields can only occur if the market is segmented. However, if the market for longer-term Treasury debt is segmented from the rest of the credit market, the effect of QE or Operation Twist on Treasury yields cannot spill over to private security yields, which matter for economic activity. Hence, the more effective QE and Operation Twist are in reducing longer-term Treasury yields, the less effective they will be in stimulating aggregate demand; the more segmented the long-term Treasury market, the smaller the effect these actions on private long-term yields.
When the trend is accounted for the evidence of an effect of QE on longer-term rates vanishes. Furthermore, there is no evidence that QE reduced long-term yields or term premiums using a variety of debt measures that are hypothesized to generate a portfolio balance effect on longer-term yields.
Given the massive failure of the EH and the weak theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence of the portfolio balance channel, I believe that neither forward guidance nor QE accounts for a significant amount of the recent decline in longer-term yields. Consistent with the classical theory of interest (Thornton, 2010d) , the decline in longer-term yields since early 2011 most likely reflects weakening expectations for economic growth in the U.S. and globally and, in the case of Treasuries, a flight to safety in response to the sovereign debt crisis. 
Are QE and Operation Twist Counterproductive?
Proponents of QE frequently suggest that even if it has little or no effect on longer-term yields, it should be done because it does no harm. I question this belief. Had the FOMC not pursued QE, the Fed's balance sheet would look pretty normal today and the federal funds rate would be closer to a rate consistent with a positive real rate of interest and the FOMC's 2 percent inflation objective, i.e., closer to the 4 percent natural rate that is characteristic of a standard Taylor rule. Had the FOMC pursued this path, I believe economic growth and employment would be higher than they currently are.
How could the FOMC's aggressive balance sheet and zero interest rate policy make things worse? My one-word answer is "expectations." It is sometimes said that if you ask 10 economists a question you will get 11 opinions. There is one area where there has been a convergence of views; the importance of expectations for economic activity. Most economists agree that if important policymakers were to tell the public that we could be facing the next Great Depression, consumption would fall like a rock, pushing the economy closer to another Depression. In a similar vein, I believe an "extreme" policy stance, such as the one the FOMC has pursued since late 2008 and indicates that it will continue until late 2014, generates expectations that the economy is much worse than it might otherwise appear. This expectations effect will be particularly important when the actions are taken at a time when there are significant signs that financial markets are stabilizing and the economy is improving. This adverse expectations effect of QE is extremely difficult to document. Nevertheless, it is possible, even likely, the Fed's extreme policies have worked against the goal they were intended to achieve.
This possibility is supported by Thornton's (2011a) (2009) contend, these announcements had the detrimental effect of increasing credit risk.
The FOMC's balance sheet and zero interest rate policies are so extreme that it is virtually impossible for anyone to believe that the economy has or is returning to "normal" while such policies are in place. A variety of financial and economic facts deny the need for such extreme policies, e.g., risk spreads are relatively low and stable, and the economy fully recovered its previous level of output in the third quarter of 2011. The extreme policy stance causes consumers and investors to be more cautious than they might be otherwise. Savers are finding it difficult to get a reasonable return, and incomes of the retired have declined drastically. Such an environment is not conducive to rational economic decision making and, consequently, economic growth.
There are other adverse effects of the FOMC's policy. Principal among these is the fact that the Fed's massive balance sheet and the FOMC's concomitant low interest rate policy enables the government to avoid dealing with its deficit/debt problem. The FOMC's zero interest rate policy has reduced the burden of the debt-the average interest rate paid on interest-bearing public debt declined from 4.2 percent in September 2008 to 2.7 percent in April 2012. The Fed's revenue from its massive portfolio reduce has also reduced the debt burden. For reasons that I 20 have discussed elsewhere (Thornton, 2010b (Thornton, , 1984 , I don't believe that the FOMC is monetizing the debt per se. Nevertheless, the Fed's balance sheet of $2.8 trillion-more than 3 times its preLehman level-makes it easier for the government to finance the debt.
What are the benefits from maintaining such an easy policy for such a long period of time? To answer this question it is useful evaluate monetary policy since January 1990. The stance of monetary policy is measured by the difference between the FOMC's target for the federal funds rate and the natural rate of interest, i.e., the interest rate consistent with the longrun real rate of interest and the FOMC's inflation objective. I assume the natural rate of interest is 4 percent, consisting of a 2 percent real interest rate and the FOMC's 2 percent inflation target. What was the effect of these markedly different long-run policies? Table 1 Whatever the explanation, these very different monetary policies appear to have little or no effect on real variables over the two decades.
Why was the stance of policy so different over these decades? A simple analysis suggests it was because the FOMC was responding to inflation and unemployment during the first period, but only unemployment during the second. It is well known that policymakers care about both inflation and output growth. This basic fact is reflected in monetary policy rules, such as the Taylor rule. While there is no evidence that the FOMC has ever followed a policy rule, it is useful to see how the stance of policy is related to inflation and output growth. This is done by estimating a simple policy reaction function of the form The results are presented in Table 2 . For the first period, either The reaction function estimates indicate that the FOMC was attempting to stabilize both inflation and unemployment in the first period, but only the unemployment rate in the second.
The focus on the real side of the economy since mid-2001 is likely a consequence of inflation being controlled by inflation expectations during the second period. With inflation expectations anchored by inflation expectations, the FOMC focused its attention on the real economy. Given the theoretical and empirical evidence that monetary policy has little-to-no effect on real variables in the long run and evidence that the interest rate channel of policy is weak more generally, it is reasonable to question the wisdom of such a policy and the FOMC's commitment to maintaining such an uncharacteristically easy policy for such a long period of time.
How the Fed Should Have Responded to the Financial Crisis
Having been critical of the Fed's monetary policy response to the financial crisis, I need to suggest how the Fed should have responded. Like many economists, I was not that concerned on August 9, 2007.
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It was also clear that the 5 percentage-point increase in home ownership that occurred between 1994 and 2006 was likely to be unsustainable and that home prices would continue to However, as more information became available it was clear that an immediate problem was that most mortgage lending was securitized based on general characteristics of the borrowers and the loans. This meant that financial institutions did not know the real value of their MBS portfolios. Consequently, lenders would be understandably concerned about making loans to institutions with large MBS portfolios, i.e., risk premiums would increase significantly.
16 I have not discussed the issue of the Fed's role in the financial crisis and what if anything the Fed should have done to help prevent it. My view is that the financial crisis is the consequence of home prices getting too far from their fundamental value. The causes are many, but much of the blame must be placed on governmental policies to encourage home ownership by extending homeownership to those who would not qualify for it under conventional lending standards. The Fed policy undoubtedly contributed to the problem during the period between 2002 and early 2005 by keeping the federal funds rate far below the rate consistent with existing economic circumstances (output grew at a 3 percent rate and inflation averaged 2.2 percent). It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the degree to which the FOMC's federal funds rate policy contributed to the financial crisis. However, I am inclined to believe that only a very restrictive interest rate policy would have had a significant effect in curbing the home-price bubble.
fall causing a further deterioration in financial markets and the economy more generally. More importantly, the bursting of the home-price bubble was going to be considerably more serious than the bursting of the dot-com bubble in the 2001 recession. The reason is that few, if any, physical assets were created during the dot-com bubble. This would not be the case for the home-price bubble. The bursting of the home-price bubble would be accompanied by a large overhang of residential real estate. There was also going to be significant overhang in commercial real estate. The equilibrating process associated with the dot-com bubble was relatively painless and quick because there was no excess of physical capital-only flows needed to adjust. As a consequence, the recession was relatively mild and short lived. Economic theory shows that stock-flow adjustments are more difficult and take much longer. Hence, this recession would be much larger and more protracted. Equilibrium would require a very large reduction in the real value of the stock of housing. This would require very large reductions in house prices since the physical quantity of houses can change only slowly. Moreover, the wealth effect on consumption would be large.
The appropriate monetary policy in this circumstance is to significantly increase the monetary base, i.e., the supply of credit, to facilitate the adjustments required to achieve a new equilibrium. Consequently, I advocated that the Fed purchase large quantities of securities to increase the supply of credit. There is no formula to know exactly how much the monetary base should be increased in such a circumstance. I recommended $600 billion, but suggested that more should be done if markets did not stabilize sufficiently. When asked by colleagues whether the Fed should restrict its purchases to Treasuries, I responded that what the Fed purchased was less important than the amount purchased. The only requirements were: (a) high-quality securities are purchased in order to minimize the Fed's credit risk, and (b) the public be informed 25 that the increase in the monetary base is temporary and that the composition of the Fed's balance sheet and the size of the monetary base would be returned to normal as financial markets and economic activity began to normalize.
By this time, the Fed had already been supplying funds to banks via the TAF. The TAF was a good idea, but the fact that TAF loans were made at subsidized rates was troublesome. The big mistake, however, was the decision to sterilize the lending. It would have been a better course of action to announce that the FOMC would suspend targeting the federal funds rate and significantly increase the supply of credit to the market by making loans and purchasing assets. I
would have announced that the additional funds would be removed and the FOMC would return to federal funds rate targeting as soon as financial markets began to stabilize. Announcing that the actions are temporary is necessary to allay concerns that the FOMC might renege on its commitment to long-run price stability.
I would have taken these actions and given them time to work. Only if it was clear that providing additional credit to the market was not helping the market would I have considered taking more extreme actions. Moreover, I would have pursued more extreme actions only if there was strong theoretical or empirical evidence (say from the experiences of other countries) supporting the effectiveness of such actions.
I thought it dangerous to translate experiences from previous U.S. financial crises to the current one. Financial markets today are just too different from those of the late 1800s or early 1900s. My working hypothesis was that information gleaned from those financial crises may not be useful for understanding or solving the current one.
I would have steadfastly declined to engage in activities that might significantly impair the Fed's independence, such as participating in the bailout of Bear Sterns, or providing credit to particular segments of the market at the expense of others. It is Congress' prerogative to decide if a firm is too-big-too fail, not the Fed's. The Fed should supply the liquidity, i.e., short-term credit, the government should provide capital if it deems it necessary to do so. If the administration or Congress wants to prevent the failure of a large "systemically significant" financial institution, for whatever reason, it must justify the action to the public and determine how to finance it. The Fed's decision to purchase $29 billion of Bear-Sterns assets of questionable quality was a huge mistake-one of many subsequent actions that may have seriously compromised the Fed's independence.
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Of course, it is impossible to prove that my approach would have resulted in a better outcome than the actions the Fed has taken. We don't get to construct controlled experiments in economics. Moreover, there is no model of the economy sufficiently good enough to construct useful simulations of alternative policy actions. Hence, the usefulness of my approach must be evaluated based on existing theory and empirical evidence.
Nevertheless, I believe that providing massive amounts of credit is effective only during the early stages of a financial crisis, when financial market turmoil and uncertainty are high.
When financial markets have stabilized considerably, supplying additional credit is relatively ineffective. This was the experience in Japan. The Bank of Japan provided no additional liquidity at the outset of its recession. It did, however, reduce its policy rate to zero and massively increase the monetary base in early 2001. The effectiveness of these actions appears to have been weak and highly uncertain (Spiegel, 2006; Bowman et al. 2011) . Moreover, financial markets (and other markets) were largely controlled by the Japanese government. Indeed, the extent of the repeatedly rejected on an empirical basis. The theoretical basis for QE or Operation Twist is questionable and there is little evidence that these policies have reduced longer-term yields significantly. The evidence using lower frequency data is weak at best and the magnitude, statistical significance, and permanence of the high-frequency effects on longer-terms yields is 28 far from compelling. Nor is there compelling evidence that central bank forward guidance policies have had a significant or lasting effect on longer-term yields.
Evidence that these policies have increased economic growth and employment is essentially nonexistent; the public's perception of the FOMC's ineffectiveness is growing (Wall Street Journal, 2012) . My own research (Thornton, 2010d; Thornton 2012c) suggests that the FOMC's low interest rate policies of the last decade have had little effect on longer-term Treasury yields or economic activity. With banks holding nearly $1.5 trillion in excess reserves, businesses with massive holdings of cash, and long-term rates significantly below any reasonable estimate of the natural rate, it is difficult to see how additional central bank asset purchases could have a significant impact on economic activity or employment.
It is also important to note that the goal of these policies is to effect economic decisions by distorting asset prices. Such distortions can have effects that hinder growth and create potential problems in the future. For example, the FOMC's zero interest rate policy has dramatically reduced the incomes of retirees and others who are dependent on their prior saving for current income. Moreover, the inability to generate reasonable income on safe short-term assets provides an incentive for both individuals and pension funds to take on more risk in their portfolios. There is evidence that the FOMC's low interest rate policy may be inflating commodity prices (Thornton, 2011b) and contributed to the housing bubble.
Given these facts, I suggest it is time for the FOMC to turn the page in its monetarypolicy playbook. My recommendation is that the FOMC announce that a continuation of the zero interest rate and unconventional policies will promote excessive risk taking and are likely to impede economic growth. Moreover, a persistent zero nominal interest rate policy is inconsistent with a positive long-run real rate of interest and the FOMC's 2 percent inflation objective. To bring interest rates more in line with the natural rate of interest, the Fed should shrink its balance sheet close to its pre-financial-crisis level. This can be accomplished through outright sales, with the pace of the sales being determined, in part, by the market's ability to absorb the securities.
When the balance sheet has shrunk sufficiently, the federal funds rate target will be increased to a level that is more consistent with the long-run natural rate of interest. The FOMC anticipates that the net effect of moving the stance of monetary policy back to "normal" will be beneficial:
investor outlook will improve, interest income will increase, and the distortionary effects of a prolonged zero interest rate on asset prices and risk taking will be eliminated.
If done carefully, with proper communication, and strong leadership I believe the new policy can be implemented with no significant effects on economic activity or financial markets.
My policy recommendation stems from a number of facts: the zero interest rate, QE, and Operation Twist policies are based on the EH (a theory of the term structure that has virtually without empirical support); evidence (Thornton, 2010d) that increased control over very shortterm rates by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and Reserve Bank of New Zealand resulted in a significant breakdown of the relationship between the long-term sovereign debt yields and the rate that central banks targeted; evidence from that same research that the classical theory of interest rates (which hypothesizes that long-term yields are driven by economic fundamentals and short-term rates linked to long-term yields by arbitrage) appears to be a better description of the behavior of interest rates along the term structure than the EH; the fact that existing evidence on central bank forward guidance policy shows no increased ability of such policies to affect longer-term yields in a manner consistent with the EH; the fact that a persistent zero nominal interest rate is inconsistent with a positive real rate of interest and a 2 percent inflation objective-such a policy will achieve one or the other but not both; my belief that it is essentially impossible to have both significant positive economic growth and a long-term real rate of interest that is zero or negative; and the fact that there is no evidence of a statistically significant or economically meaningful liquidity effect. 19 Friedman (1970) , p. 18. 
